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Scientific Knowledge in Aristotle’s Biology 
 
Barbara Botter 
Professor 
Federal University of Espírito Santo (UFES) - Vitória 
Brazil 
 
Abstract 
 
Aristotle was the first thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific 
knowledge, which he set out in Posterior Analytics. Furthermore, the “special 
sciences”, i.e., biology, zoology and the natural sciences in general, originated 
with Aristotle. A classical question is whether the mathematical axiomatic 
method proposed by Aristotle in the Analytics is independent of the special 
sciences. If so, Aristotle would have been unable to match the natural sciences 
with the scientific patterns he established in the Analytics. In this paper, I reject 
this pessimistic approach towards the scientific value of natural sciences. I 
believe that there are traces of biology in the Analytics as well as traces of the 
Analytics’ theory in zoological treatises. Moreover, for a lack of chronological 
clarity, I think it’s better to unify Aristotle’s model of scientific research, which 
includes Analytics and the natural sciences together. 
 
Keywords: Aristotle, Scientific Knowledge, Zoology, Demonstration. 
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Introduction 
 
Aristotle was one of the greatest philosophers of biology. He devoted part 
of his life to the systematic investigation of animals. Before him, many of his 
predecessors wrote reflections about nature, but nobody developed a science of 
living beings.  
This fact, together with the fact that Aristotle was the first to articulate a 
model of scientific investigation, raises the question about the relationship 
between science of biology and the model of science established in the 
Analytics. 
This uncertainty remains, regardless of the chronology assigned to the 
Aristotelian canon for three reasons. First, though it is likely that the Analytics 
is among Aristotle’s early writings, it is difficult to believe that he could have 
produced the Analytics after having finished his biological studies. Second, 
evidence from Aristotle’s discussions of animals and places indicates that at 
least a portion of his biological studies may have been written soon after the 
death of Plato, but it is unlikely that all of them were written at that time. It is 
more reasonable to assume that his biological works were written over a long 
period of time, part of which coincided with his composition of the Analytics. 
Finally, if the Analytics were drafted after the biological writings, why did 
Aristotle propose a mathematical axiomatic method after conducting a different 
type of scientific inquiry? Do the Analytics represent a rejection of the work he 
did in his biological studies? The crux of the question is not why there are no 
traces of the Analytics in Aristotle’s biology, but why there are no traces of 
biology in the Analytics. Though the problem is inverted, the terms are the 
same. 
I want to soften this picture. I believe that there are elements of biology in 
the Analytics and elements of Analytics in natural treatises. In natural treatises 
Aristotle states that he aims at generating demonstrations and shows the 
differences with the type required in theoretical sciences
1
. On the other hand, in 
the Posterior Analytics Aristotle uses examples drawn from meteorology
2
, 
botanic
3
 and zoology
4
 together with mathematical examples. Moreover, in 
Posterior Analytics II 12, the philosopher explicitly introduces the 
demonstration of events that come to be usually rather than universally
5
. 
                                                          
1
Aristotle, Parts of Animals I 1, Physics II 9, Generation of Animals II 6 and Generation and 
Corruption II 11. 
2
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 89b27-31; 90a1-5; 90a14-25; 93a22-25; 93a30-35; 93b8-
15; 94a3-4; 94b31-37; 95a15-22; 98a30-35. 
3
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 98a37-98b16; 98b34-99a1; 99a24-30.  
4
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 89b43-35; 91a25-30; 91a37; 91b5-8; 91b18-20; 92a1-3; 
92a30-35; 94b10-25; 96b33-97a5; 97a35; 98a3-23. 98a37-98b25; 99b5-7. 
5
Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 12, 96a12-19: “If A is predicated universally of B, and B 
universally of C, A must also be predicated of C, and of all C [...]. But ex hypothesi A is 
predicated for the most part of C, then the middle term B must also be for the most part. Thus, 
the immediate premises of for the most part events must also describe states or processes 
which are for the most part”. 
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My study consists in three parts: in the first section, I present the reasons 
that support doubts about the scientific character of natural treatises; in the 
second section, I focus on the model of science and on the place of natural 
science within this model; in the final section, I discuss the demonstration of 
processes in natural treatises.  
 
 
Status Quaestionis 
 
There are strong arguments that support doubts about the natural treatises’ 
scientific character
1
. The position defended by the scholars is that a) in natural 
treatises there isn’t demonstration of the type Aristotle has exemplified from 
geometry in the Analytics
2; b) Aristotle’s natural works do not include 
definitions capable of becoming premises in a syllogistic structure of 
demonstration. 
The arguments for the natural treatises’ limited scientific value have 
acquired many proponents since the early twentieth century and have been the 
subject of lively debate, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s with the works of 
David Balme, Robert Bolton, David Charles, Wolfgang Detel, Allan Gotthelf, 
Wolfgang Kullmann, Pierre Pellegrin and James G. Lennox. These scholars 
think that Aristotle’s zoological treatises reflect scientific ideas and 
explanations expressed in the Analytics, but they introduce also a variety of 
concepts that the Analytics ignore.  
The differences between the canonical model of demonstration proposed 
by the Analytics and the inquiries in the natural sciences are evident. In the 
Analytics, Aristotle demands that the behaviour of the scientific object be 
without variation (ANGIONI 2002, 2)
3; and he never mentions “conditional 
necessity”, even in his short discussion of natural processes4. Additionally, in 
Generation and Corruption II 11, 338b6-11, Aristotle explains that contingent 
relations pertain to the natural processes that are rectilinear and concern 
perishable substances. In this case, the inference necessitates the effect only in 
a conditional way and the nature of the causal inference is modal
5
. 
Because natural entities are composed by matter, which is, by definition, a 
principle of movement and accidental change, natural entities do not exhibit 
absolutely an unchanging behaviour
6
. Therefore, it is impossible to understand 
them scientifically because only in that “which cannot be otherwise”, which is 
                                                          
1LLOYD 1990 provides an overview of experts’ positions on this problem. Important 
contributions have also been made by LENNOX 2001 and BOLTON 1987. 
2
See LLOYD 1996, 7-37. 
3
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 4, 73a21; I 6, 74b5; I 8, 75b24.  
4
Aristotle , Posterior Analytics II 11, 94b27-95a9. 
5The expression “modal notion of necessity” concerns with the nature of causal inference, 
when the cause necessitates the effect only in the general run and contingently. Cfr. Aristotle, 
Partibus of Animals I 1, 639b29-640a9; Physics II 9, 200a15-30; Generation and Corruption II 
11, 337b14-25; II 11, 338b10-11. For the modal nature of causal inference, see LEUNISSEN 
2010, p. 46-48. 
6
Aristotle, Metaphysics VII 5, 1032a20-21; VII 14, 1039b27-1040a2. 
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eternal and necessary, does science exists. Other entities are beyond science’s 
purview: “Though there are things which are true and real and yet can be 
otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern them”1. 
Other important argument supporting the incompatibility of scientific 
theory and natural science addresses the part that causality plays within 
demonstration. For Aristotle, scientific knowledge is knowledge of causes 
achieved through demonstration
2
. Such demonstrations rely on premises that 
are undeniable, true, universal and necessary
3. Thus, “science” is, for Aristotle, 
equivalent to apodictic or causal syllogism
4
. However, as Angioni (ANGIONI 
2002, 9-10) observes, the theory of the four causes established in Physics II 3 
and present also in Metaphysics I, On the Soul and in the biological works is 
unsatisfactorily discussed in the Posterior Analytics
5
. Moreover, according to 
Barnes, the two examples in Posterior Analytics II 11 94a36-b8 involving 
change hardly look like scientific demonstrations at all (BARNES 1993, 228-
229)
6
. Finally, the philosopher does not clarify how final causes fit into a rigid 
structure in which the cause is the middle term of a sillogism
7
. 
 
 
The Method of the Scientific Knowledge 
 
In this paper, I try to show that the theory of science outlined by Aristotle 
in the Posterior Analytics is compatible with the investigative and definitional 
method that the philosopher prescribes in his writings on the natural sciences, 
particularly zoology, and that behind certain biological inquires lie principles 
enunciated in the Analytics. 
Two points should be emphasized to prevent the biological works from 
being considered a form of weak knowledge inferior to the strength of 
mathematic axiomatic method. 
The first point is that the theory of deduction offered in the Analytics 
should not be reduced to an abstract method for the ideal systematisation of 
science but should be thought as the form of scientific knowledge itself. The 
Aristotelian idea that the science is a type of demonstrative knowledge implies 
                                                          
1
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 33, 88b32-34. 
2
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b 9; b16-19; cf. Prior Analytics I 4, 25b26-31 and 
Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b9-19; I 6, 74b26-32; I 13, 78a22-79a16; I 14, 79a17-24; 85b23-27; 
I 31, 87b33-88a11; II 2, 89b36-90a11; II 7, 92a34-37;  
3
For a discussion of true premises, see Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b 19-33; I 2, 72a6-7; I 3, 
72b18-25; I 4, 73a21-74a2; I 6, 74b5-75a32. About primitive and immediate premises, see 
Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b26-27; 72a6-7; 72a7-8; I 15, 79a33-36; 79a38; I 23, 84b31-85a1. 
About universal premises see Posterior Analytics I 4, 73a21-74a2. About necessary premises 
see Posterior Analytics I 6, 74b5-75a32.  
4
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b16-19; cf. Prior Analytics I 4, 25b26-31; Posterior 
Analytics II 7, 92a34-37. Aristotle illustrates causal syllogism in Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b9-
19; I 6, 74b26-32; I 13, 78a22-79a16; I 14, 79a17-24; 85b23-27; I 31, 87b33-88a11; II 2, 
89b36-90a11.  
5
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 11, 940a36-b8. 
6
See LEUNISSEN 2010, 36-37. 
7
See BARNES 2005, 92. 
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that it should be presented in the form of a systematic exposition of chains of 
syllogisms. However, it is clear that this is not the case in either the sciences 
upon which Aristotle modelled his arguments, such as mathematics, or in 
Aristotle’s scientific practice. Greek geometry is demonstrative, but its 
demonstrations cannot be reduced to chains of syllogisms. In the Corpus 
Aristotelicum undisputed examples of syllogistic demonstrations are even rarer 
both in the more abstract sciences and in the special sciences. The classic 
solution suggested by Jonathan Barnes (BARNES 1993, XII) is that Aristotle 
conceived the Analytics as a paradeigma, i.e., an ideal and abstract model of a 
complete and finished science, and that the zoological writings record the 
philosopher’s research efforts.  
I believe that this solution is unnecessary and even impossible. In the 
opening passage of the Posterior Analytics, the philosopher says: “knowledge 
comes through demonstration. By “demonstration” I mean a scientific 
syllogism, and by “scientific syllogism” I mean a syllogism by virtue of which, 
by having it, we know scientifically”1. The syllogism is the specific form of 
scientific knowledge. Through demonstration, the entities, the form and the 
order of nature can be scientifically known. The syllogism is more than an 
ideal form, although abstract, of scientific knowledge, it is its cause. Believing 
that syllogistic demonstration is only a paradigmatic example of scientific 
discovery is like stating that no knowledge of this type yet exists or, if 
scientific knowledge does exist, there is little of it. However, such pessimism is 
not expressed in Aristotle’s writings; the opposite is true2. The philosopher 
offers more scientific contributions (as opposed to philosophical contributions) 
when the discussion turns to zoology (ANGIONI 2002, 1), and in the 
biological works, History of Animals, Parts of Animals and Generation of 
Animals, “states explicitly that he aims at generating demonstrations of same 
sort” (LEUNISSEN 2010, 32)3. It thus seems more reasonable to inquiry the 
extent of the relationship between the demonstrative science and the natural 
inquiries than to question this relationship. 
 
 
Two Misunderstandings  
 
I think that the pessimistic approach to the natural treatises’ scientific 
value is based on two misunderstandings. The first is about the epistemological 
statute of zoological treatises; the second relates to the biological treatises’ 
position within the unified edifice of science.  
 
                                                          
1
Aristotle Posterior Analytics I 1, 71b16-19. 
2
See CRUBELLIER & PELLEGRIN 2002, 51-52. 
3
See Aristotle, History of Animals I 6, 491a7-13; Parts of Animals IV 10, 689a9-13; 
Generation of Animals II 6, 742b23-36; II 8 and IV 9, 769a14-25. 
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The First Misunderstanding 
As Berti (BERTI 1998, 48) noted, the distance between the Analytics and 
the biological and zoological works is created by the more “relaxed”1 form of 
rationality of natural sciences, although this does not indicate an inferior degree 
of scientific knowledge. In Book VI of Metaphysics, Aristotle identifies the 
object of natural science as “that substance that is for the most part2 according 
to form, but is not separated”3. Natural substance is, therefore, determined by 
form; however, because its form is deep-rooted in matter and involved with 
change and movement, a natural substance is not “always” determined by the 
form, as in the case of mathematical entities, but only in the general run and 
not universally. To use a contemporary expression, we can attribute to natural 
science a “weak rationality” and to the science described in the Analytics a 
“strong rationality” (BERTI 1998, 49 and 54), but the intent of this 
terminology is not to deny the scientific value of zoology. This weakness is 
justified by the object of the natural sciences and allows to natural substance to 
be more closely and deeply known. 
 
The Second Misunderstanding 
The second misunderstanding concerns the biological treatises’ position 
into the scientific knowledge. It is unreasonable to expect the zoological 
treatises to present first and definitive definitions of phenomena capable of 
acting as premises in a chain of scientific inferences. The philosopher was 
inaugurating a new science: zoology. A substantial amount of information was 
to be collected, selected, recorded and systematised (BARNES 2005, 27; see 
also 22). All of these elements constitute preliminary data for developing the 
science that justify why what is known is true. Angioni (ANGIONI 2002, 8) 
observes that Aristotle’s zoological writings are located in the ascending phase 
of the research, rather than the descending one, where conclusions are 
progressively demonstrated from their own principles and, ultimately, from 
first definitions
4
. In Book II of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle recognises 
that there are different types of definitions that reflect the distinction between 
different levels of knowledge
5
. Preliminary definitions correspond to the results 
of preliminary inquiries, and real definitions determine what something is and 
explain why it must be so. Both types of definitions have scientific value and 
are part of scientific development. 
In the next part I briefly talk about demonstration in biological treatises. 
 
                                                          
1
The Greek word is malakoteron. See Aristotle, Metaphysics V 1, 1025b13. At the lines 
1025b6-13, Aristotle distinguishes the rationality of physics from mathematics’ rationality. 
2
The Greek expression is hos epi to poly, that means ‘in the general run’ and not universally.  
3
Aristotle, Metaphysics VI 1, 1025b26-28. 
4
See BALME 1987 and LENNOX 2001. 
5
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 8-10. 
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Demonstration in Zoology
1
 
 
In Parts of Animals I 1, Aristotle introduces the model of demonstration at 
work in natural treatises. The sublunary phenomena involve movement, 
processes and change over time and hold only for the most part
2
.  
The processes can be simultaneous, when the cause and the effect occur in 
the same time; or can occur at different instances in a sequence, as in the case 
of embryogenesis. The two processes are similar but not identical. The most 
important difference is that in processes that occur at different instances of 
time, there will be a moment when the cause has occurred but not yet the 
effect
3
.  
Aristotle argues about the demonstration of processes that occur in 
simultaneous time in Generation of Animals book V, where he indicates the 
parts of animals by which the animals differ
4
. 
Let me give an example. The eye-colour changes simultaneously with the 
level of water in the eyes
5
. Schematically we get: 
 
A: colour; B level of water; C: eye  
A (aC) ≈simultaneous B (aC) 
 
When the natural level of water is low the eye-colour is blue; when the 
natural level of water is high the eye-colour is brown or black. As Leunissen 
suggests, Aristotle distinguishes the demonstration of being from the 
demonstration of processes that occur simultaneously in Posterior Analytics II 
12, 95a10-24
6
. In the Posterior Analytics, the Aristotle’s example is the process 
process of eclipsing, that occur simultaneously (hama gignetai)
7
 with 
“obstructing by the earth”. In the Analytics, the demonstration of processes 
justifies the presence of an attribute belonging to a certain subject and is 
formally the same as demonstration of being. However, “the terms in the 
former [in demonstration of processes] get tensed” (LEUNISSEN 2010, 38).  
In biological works, explanations that pick out causes that not occur 
simultaneously with the effect are more common than simultaneous processes. 
                                                          
1
My discussion is greatly indebt to LEUNISSEN 2010, who offers an excellent analysis of 
Posterior Analytics II 11 and 12 and suggests the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of 
demonstration in these chapters for his theory os demonstrations in natural treatises. 
2
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 1, 639a12-15; 640a1-9; 640a33-b3; 642a32-b2. 
3
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, Posterior Analytics II 12 95b13-15, b 19-20, b 24-25, b 
31-37. See LEUNISSEN 2010, 54-48 and Kupreeva, forthcoming, apud Leunissen 2010. 
4
Aristotle uses the Greek verb symmetaballo to indicate that cause and effect occur 
simultaneously. In Generation of Animals V 4, 784b25- 31, for instance, Aristotle explains the 
cause of grey hair: “There are many instances of people having grown grey hair as an aftermath 
of desease, but later on [...] when health is restored, people accomplish a change [...] and, in 
consequence, the condition also accomplish a corresponding change (symmetaballousi). See 
also V 3, 783 b 30, where Aristotle explains the cause of high-pitched voice or deep voice. 
5
Aristotle, Generation of Animals V 1, 779b2; V 3, 784a4-5; V 6, 785b16-22; V 6, 786a4; V 2, 
781a33-34; V 3 783a11-32; V 3, 784a12-20; V 6, 786a303-34. 
6
See LEUNISSEN 2010, 38-42. 
7
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II 12, 95a22-25.  
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The syllogistic structure of demonstration diverges to demonstration of 
mathematical objects for three reasons: first, the nature of causal inference: the 
relationship between the cause and the effect is modal
1
; second, the direction of 
the inference: the syllogism is possible only from the effect to the cause, that is, 
from the posterior to the prior; third, the chronological order of causal 
sequence: the order and the time of processes are important to determine the 
causal priority of factors.  
I’ll examine in the following the three factors.  
First, Aristotle uses a modal notion of necessity in Partibus Animalium I 1 
and Physics II 9
2
, where he distinguishes the nature and the direction of causal 
inference in theoretical demonstration and in demonstration of natural 
processes. The expression “modal notion of necessity” concerns with the 
nature of causal inference, when the cause necessitates the effect only for the 
most part and contingently
3
. In Generation of Animals V 3, 783a16-18, for 
instance, Aristotle argues that the reason of hard hair is the cold temperature of 
environment. The cold air, a material external cause, congeals the hair and 
dries them. In other words, hard and earth hair is due to the cessation of heat in 
the environment. The relation between the cessation of heat and the 
solidification of the hair is not necessary, because we cannot infer the effect 
from the presence of the cause, but we can infer from the presence of the effect 
the occurrence of the cause. 
Second, the philosopher explains that in linear sequences in which the 
cause precedes the effects and does not occur in simultaneous time with the 
effect, the sillogism in possible only from the posterior to the prior
4
. The 
inference is one-directional, as in theoretical and mathematical sciences, but 
the inference’s direction is different: in eternal and cyclical phenomena, the 
cause is the prior, from which the effect is derived, and the relationship 
between cause and effect is necessary. In sciences that deal with natural 
perishable substances, the inference is only from the effect to cause, because it 
will not necessary follow that because it is true to say that X happened, it is 
also true to say that Y will happen. Other factors can prevent the effect from 
happening
5
. 
Third, in natural teleological processes, the demonstration must not only 
determine the primary middle term of syllogism, but also specify the 
sequence’s order of process. In Physics II 6 Aristotle says: “For with regard to 
generation it is mostly in this way that people investigate into the explanation – 
                                                          
1For “modal use of necessity” see Kupreeva (forthcomig) apud LEUNISSEN 2010, 45-47. 
According to Leunissen, Aristotle uses a model necessity in Posterior Analytics II 12. See II 
12, 95a24-b1; 95b13-17. 
2
Aristotle, Physics II 9, 200a15-30; Parts of Animals I 1, 639b29-40a9. 
3
Aristotle, Generation and Corruption II 11, 338b9-11: “For it is not necessary, if your father 
came to be, that you come to be, but if you came to be, then he came to be”. 
4
Leunissen examines Posterior Analytics II 12, 95a29 and a32-37, where Aristotle argues about 
the direction of causal order (LEUNISSEN 2010, 50-52). 
5
See WIELAND 1975, 232. 
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what comes to be after what? And, what was the first to act or to undergo? And 
in this way at each step of the series”1. 
This worry for specifying the order of generation is manifest specifically 
in the discussion about embryogenesis
2
. In Generation of Animals II 6, 
Aristotle clarifies that the “order in generation” and the “order in being” differ: 
whereas the “order in being” depends from relations in nature and in definition, 
the “order in generation” is depicted as a chronological order. 
“Some of the early physiologers endeavoured to describe the order in 
which the various parts are formed, but they were none too well acquainted 
with what actually happens. As with everything else, so with the parts of body: 
one is, by nature, prior to another. But the term “prior” at once comprises a 
variety of meanings. E.g., take the difference between (a) that “for the sake of 
which” a thing is, and (b) that thing which is “for its sake”: of these, one (b) is 
prior in point of formation, while the other (a) is prior in point of being or 
reality”3. 
The explanation of embryological development starts from what is closest 
to the present and from there infers the necessary prerequisites. When the 
process is constituted with a series of following movements, the causal priority 
is determined by chronological priority and we must draw inferences from the 
end to what necessarily had to have occurred earlier
4
. 
Aristotle concludes that in the cases of things which always are, we have 
something eternal, yet there is a cause for them and they are demonstrable
5
. 
With those things, the principle is the essence
6
. But as soon as we begin to deal 
deal with those things that come into being through a process of formation,  
“we find there are several first principles – principles, however, of a 
different kind and not all of the same kind. Among them the source whence the 
movement comes must be reckoned as one”7. 
In an excellent analysis of Posterior Analytics II 12, Leunissen 
(LEUNISSEN 2010, 42-57) persuasively suggests that when Aristotle wrote 
this work, he had the methodological preoccupation with the chronological 
order of processes that come to be in nature and, at least, a notion of modal 
necessity. Thus, he provides the bases for the model of demonstration in 
natural and zoological sciences.  
 
                                                          
1
Aristotle, Physics II 7, 198a34-5.  
2
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II, especially II 6.  
3
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742a16-25. See also Parts of Animals II 646a24-b2. 
4We have these three things “first of all there must of necessity exist some part in which the 
principle of movement resides (for of course this is a part of the End, and the supreme 
controlling part of it); after that comes the animal as a whole, i.e., the End; third and last of all 
come the parts which serve these as instruments for various employments” (Aristotle, 
Generation of Animals II 6, 742a35-b10). 
5
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b27. 
6
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b35. 
7
Aristotle, Generation of Animals II 6, 742b33-35. 
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Conclusion 
 
With my paper, I hope to have showed that Aristotle’s scientific theory is 
not an austere and formal model of demonstration. The Aristotelian science is a 
single and unitary type of research, that encompasses experiences in the nature 
and the scientific patterns outlined in the logical treatises. 
Although the epistemological statute of the zoological treatises differs 
from the epistemological method of the Analytics, the natural sciences do not 
exhibit a lesser degree of scientificity. The “weak rationality” of zoology is 
determined by the object of its inquiry and by its position within the structure 
of science. Although the natural sublunary phenomena can be scientifically 
studied, it is necessary to use a model of demonstration that incorporates into 
the syllogistic structure the movement and the change over time.  
It is evident that, for Aristotle, many of the entities that constitute the 
domain of nature have the same structure and are subject to the same treatment 
as the phenomena examined in the Posterior Analytics, but it is necessary to 
think to the geometric-style of Analytics in a more flexible way. 
Let’s me close with the rhetorical question of James Lennox (LENNOX 
2001, 6): “It is plausible that a philosopher as systematic as Aristotle could 
formulate the first rigorous theory of scientific inquiry and demonstration, 
pepper the treatise in which he does so with biological examples, and then not 
aim to structure his science of animals in accordance with that theory?”. 
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